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To appear in Hugh Slotten (ed.), The Cambridge History of Science:  volume VIII 
Modern Science in National, Transnational, and Global Context (Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming 2018). 
 
THE UNITED KINGDOM1 
 
David Edgerton and John V. Pickstone† 
 
The territory of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and (Northern) Ireland, as it now is, 
has been the site of major scientific endeavours from the seventeenth century to the present, 
as is evident from any history of science.  Indeed with the great expansion of Anglophone 
historiography of science since the 1970s, British cases, for the period 1750 to 1914 
especially were central to general arguments about the nature of science, situated in very 
local contexts, but speaking to global concerns.2 In contrast, national modes of writing long 
suggested systematic deficits in British science. In the 1820s, Charles Babbage reflected 
on the “decline of science” compared to Continental Europe, and later in the century 
scientific campaigns relied on exaggerated contrasts with other nations, especially 
 
1 Thanks to Sam Alberti, Peter Bowler, Sabine Clarke, Jonathan Harwood, Jeff Hughes, Greta Jones, 
Andrew Mendelsohn, Jack Morrell, Joan Mottram, Andrew Warwick, Duncan Wilson, and Michael 
Worboys for their comments and suggestions leading to the 2008 version of this paper. That paper was the 
subject of a workshop at the Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine at King’s College 
London in June 2016 at which many useful comments were made. David Edgerton is grateful to John 
Pickstone’s family for permission to revise what is his last work for publication, and dedicates it to his 
memory.  John Pickstone died in February 2014. 
2 For example, Bernard Lightman, ed., Victorian Science in Context (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008). Evolution has been a central concern. See, for example, Robert M. Young, Darwin’s Metaphor: 
Nature’s Place in Victorian Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
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Germany.3  This history of retardation appears to some degree in J. D. Bernal’s work of 
the 1930s, and very clearly in C. P. Snow’s 1950s essay on The Two Cultures  (much is a 
brief history of British science) as well as in many later reflections by scientists.4  Many 
academic historians of British science also echoed this analysis in work from the 1950s to 
the 1980s and indeed beyond.5  Indeed the deficit account of British science (with 
exceptions made for “pure” science) was a central element in the declinist national 
 
3 Charles Babbage, Reflections on the Decline of Science in England, and on Some of its Causes (London: 
B. Fellowes, 1830); Graeme Gooday, "Lies, Damned Lies and Declinism: Lyon Playfair, the Paris 1867 
Exhibition and the Contested Rhetorics of Scientific Education and Industrial Performance," in The Golden 
Age. Essays in British Social and Economic History, 1850-70, ed. Ian Inkster (London: Ashgate, 2000). 
4 For the idea of “anti-histories” of British science see David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain 1920-1970 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 5. 
5 J. D. Bernal, The Social Function of Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1939); Donald S. L. 
Cardwell, The Organisation of Science in England (London: Heinemann, 1957); C. P. Snow, The Two 
Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959); J. G. Crowther, 
Science and Modern Society (London: Cresset, 1967); Hilary Rose and Steven Rose, Science and Society 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969); P. G. Werskey, The Visible College: A Collective Biography of British 
Scientists and Socialists of 1930s (London: Allen Lane, 1978, Free Association, 1988); Philip Gummett, 
Scientists in Whitehall (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980); F. Steward and David Wield, 
“Science, Planning and the State,” in State and Society in Contemporary Britain, ed. G. McLennan et al. 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1984), pp. 176-203; Peter Alter, The Reluctant Patron: Science and the State in Britain 
1850-1920 (Oxford: Berg, 1987); Tom Wilkie, British Science and Politics since 1945 (London: Blackwell, 
1991). On engineers see Robert A. Buchanan, The Engineers: A History of the Engineering Profession in 
Britain, 1750-1914 (London: Jessica Kingsley, 1989). 
 3 
historiography of late nineteenth and twentieth century Britain.6 Thus British history and 
the history of British science were brought together in a way that marginalised science, as 
part of an argument for more science.  
 
However, the nature of the historical arguments about science and the nation has shifted 
very significantly since the early 1990s, to one where the United Kingdom has been clearly 
one of the great scientific powers. It is the presence and significance of science for national 
and imperial history which is now stressed, in a new synthesis in which the strength of 
British science is  used to explain many distinctive features of the United Kingdom. In this 
new narrative the declinist accounts have their place, not as true accounts to be used as 
sources, but as a historical peculiarity of interest. This chapter is a first attempt to provide 
general synthetic account of British science/science in British national and imperial history 
in the light of these fresh approaches. Its purpose is to guide students to arguments and 
literatures, and to help them avoid many common misunderstandings derived from the 
 
6 For declinist accounts see David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and 
Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969); Keith Pavitt, ed., Technical Innovation and British Economic Performance (London: 
Macmillan, 1980); Correlli Barnett, The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation 
(London: Macmillan, 1986). For a review of the declinist literature, a definition, and alternatives see David 
Edgerton, “The Prophet Militant and Industrial: The Peculiarities of Correlli Barnett,” in Twentieth Century 
British History, 2 (1991), 360-79; David Edgerton, Science, Technology and the British Industrial 
‘Decline’ 1870-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); David Edgerton, “The Decline of 
Declinism,” Business History Review, 71 (1997), 201-6; Jim Tomlinson, The Politics of Decline. 
Understanding Post-war Britain (Harlow: Longman, 2001). 
Commented [HS1]: Should there be an “is “ here? 
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older framings (which alas persist), and to help others towards richer visions of the 
intersections of scientific and national histories, and to sensible international comparisons.7  
This account draws on particular ways of framing what we take to be science, one which 
stresses the varieties of knowledge and practice, their connections to institutions, and 
rejects the identification of science with research in selected academic disciplines – thus 
the attention given here to science in medicine and medical education, chemistry, 
engineering, mathematics, industry, and the military; the attention to research and non-
research science, the importance of museums as well as laboratories, and so on.8  For 
reasons of space and practicality only intermittent attention is given to the social sciences, 
recognizing that this is an area of increasing interest.9 We are not setting out to describe 
 
7 For recent powerful examples see David Bloor, The Enigma of the Aerofoil: Rival Theories in 
Aerodynamics, 1909-1930 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011), comparing UK and Germany; Chris 
Manias, Race, Science, and the Nation: Reconstructing the Ancient Past in Britain, France and Germany 
(London: Routledge, 2013); William Thomas, Rational Action: The Sciences of Policy in Britain and 
America, 1940-1960 (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2015); Hermione Giffard, Making Jet Engines in 
World War II: Britain, Germany, and the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
8 For methods and exemplification see John V. Pickstone, Ways of Knowing: A New History of Science, 
Technology and Medicine (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001); John Pickstone, “Science in 
Nineteenth Century England: Plural Configurations and Singular Politics,” in The Organisation of 
Knowledge in Victorian Britain, ed. M. Daunton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, for the British 
Academy, 2005), pp. 29-60; David Edgerton, "Time, Money, and History," Isis, 103 (2012), 316-27. 
9 Some recent studies from historians/sociologists include Michael Savage, Identities and Social Change in 
Britain since 1940: The Politics of Method (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Peter Mandler,  
Return from the Natives: How Margaret Mead Won the Second World War and Lost the Cold War 
(London: Yale University Press, 2013); Erik Linstrum, Ruling Minds: Psychology in the British Empire 
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science in the United Kingdom in all its manifestations, but to emphasize particular forms 
that are especially significant/different in the British case. We will start not with the 
scientific or the industrial revolutions, or in the city, but in the countryside.  
 
The British Enlightenment in Countryside and City 
In an article on the peculiarities of the English, E. P. Thompson argued that the 
rationalisation and empiricism usually associated with the industrial revolution was first 
established in the countryside.  In those newly enclosed landscapes, calculating tenant 
farmers and “improving” landlords saw that sheep might be “machines for turning grass 
into money.”10  Natural history, especially botany, was a common recreation of substantial 
land-owners and parsons, and of their wives and children.11 They planted gardens, collected 
specimens, “improved” agriculture, and patronised the gentry, clergy, and professionals of 
the neighbouring county towns.  They encouraged visiting lecturers and local medical 
charities and agricultural shows.  It was part of a culture of collections and representations 
that included coins and prints, books and portraits, antiques and garden plants, as well as 
the creations of God.  And the distinctions were fluid.  Landscapes were created to look 
 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016). Mathew Thomson,  Psychological Subjects: Identity, 
Culture, and Health in Twentieth-Century Britain Oxford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006),  
 
10 E. P. Thompson, “The Peculiarities of the English,” (1965), reprinted in The Poverty of Theory (London: 
Merlin, 1978). 
11 David E. Allen, The Naturalist in Britain: A Social History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994). 
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like pictures, and “pictured” through looking frames; prints were collected and inserted 
into dismembered books, or into scrap-books that could also contain pressed plants or 
pictures of animals.  Plants could be classified, but so could portraits of English rulers, 
generals, and bishops.12  Humans and their illnesses appeared in natural histories of man 
and in Hippocratic understanding of environments and disease.13  And since Britain was 
already a major colonial power, with great plantations in the Americas, British natural 
history was correspondingly global, as indeed it remained until the later twentieth 
century.14  
 
This rural and aristocratic culture deeply affected the science of the metropolis.  Aristocrats 
and high gentry often spent part of the year in London, where they could join special 
societies for botany, say, or antiquarianism.  Thus in London, as also in Edinburgh and 
Dublin, the knowledges of the provinces were drawn together and reinforced with the 
metropolitan expertise of doctors, instrument makers, and lecturers.  The Royal Society of 
London, dating from the seventeenth-century Restoration, was notably aristocratic and its 
Proceedings carried many reports of local phenomena.  The Royal Society of Edinburgh 
 
12 Marcia Pointon, Hanging the Head: Portraiture and Social Formation in Eighteenth-Century England 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). 
13 Roy Porter, The Making of Geology: Earth Science in Britain, 1660-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977); L. J. Jordanova and Roy Porter, eds., Images of the Earth; Essays in the History of 
the Environmental Sciences (Chalfont St. Giles: British Society for the History of Science, 1979). 
14 Robert Stafford, Scientist of Empire: Sir Roderick Murchison, Scientific Exploration and Victorian 
Imperialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Richard Drayton, Nature's Government: 
Science, Imperial Britain, and the Improvement of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). 
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(founded in 1783) and the Royal Irish Academy in Dublin (1785)15 reflected the 
enlightenment cultural revivals in the home nations.  Aristocratic philanthropists founded 
one of the key scientific arenas of scientific London, the Royal Institution, in 1799, to help 
better the conditions of the poor by improving agriculture and the sanitation of cities.16   
 
The culture of improvement was far from just being aristocratic. In London, as in the new 
provincial centers of industry, educated gentry, clergy, and doctors might discuss schemes 
for manufactures, or for the better running of schools or charities – well illustrated by the 
Lunar Society (an informal dining club in the West Midlands), by the Manchester Literary 
and Philosophical Society, and by the new encyclopaedias and magazines that presented 
 
15 For introductions to eighteenth century themes see G. S. Rousseau and Roy Porter, eds., The Ferment of 
Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of Eighteenth-Century Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980); Roy Porter, The Enlightenment (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001); Roy Porter, ed, The 
Cambridge Illustrated History of Medicine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Roy Porter, 
ed, Cambridge History of Science, vol. 4: Eighteenth-Century Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003). 
16 Morris Berman, Social Change and Scientific Organisation: The Royal Institution, 1799-1844 (London, 
Heinemann Educational, 1978). 
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“histories” of industry and of society, as well as of nature.17 Enlightenment knowledge was 
utilitarian as well as decorative, and analytical as well as natural-historical.18 
 
In this account it may be noted that universities have been absent, perhaps unfairly.  Indeed, 
Cambridge in particular had been reformed in the late eighteenth century with the 
introduction of written exams, and later the development of very intensive and large-scale 
pedagogical regimes based on mathematics.19 Scottish universities were especially 
significant in this period.20 From the Act of Union in 1707, when Scotland lost its own 
parliament, civic leaders worried about the draining of wealth and influence from 
Edinburgh to London.  To stem that tide, the “new town” was planned and Edinburgh 
University was regenerated on the model of Leiden, to attract students from England and 
the American colonies, and to educate Scottish students who might otherwise go abroad.  
Edinburgh was the chief university for the educated Dissenters of England, and its teachers 
 
17 R. E. Schofield, The Lunar Society of Birmingham: A Social History of Provincial Science and Industry 
in Eighteenth-century England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963); Ian Inkster, The Social Context of an 
Educational Movement: a Revisionist Approach to the English Mechanics’ Institutes, 1820-1850 (Oxford: 
Carfax Publishing, 1976). 
18 Larry Stewart, The Rise of Public Science: Rhetoric, Technology and Natural Philosophy (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1992); Roy Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern 
World (London: Penguin, 2001). 
19 Andrew Warwick, Masters of Theory: A Pedagogical History of Mathematical Physics at Cambridge, 
1760-1930 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003). 
20 N. T. Philippson and Rosalind Mitchison, eds., Scotland in the Age of Improvement: Essays in Scottish 
History in the Eighteenth Century (Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 1970). 
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a major reference point for formal and informal medical and scientific groupings in the 
industrialising provinces. Science was, of course, bourgeois too.  
 
Politics: Repression and Resurgence 
The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars might be seen as separating the characteristic 
cultural forms of the eighteenth-century from those of the nineteenth.  As well as impacting 
very directly on the British Isles, fostering it is claimed a new notion of Britishness, the 
wars were of obvious political and ideological significance at home, with complex 
consequences for scientific knowledge.  So as to avoid suppression, some of the nascent 
working class societies presented themselves as engaged with science rather than politics.21  
Middle-class groupings, such as the Literary and Philosophical Societies, found it 
convenient to focus on chemistry or meteorology when their memberships were deeply 
divided over political and social questions.22  In Edinburgh, from the 1790s, the free-
thinking enlightenment heroes came under attack from evangelicals eager to recruit a more 
traditional God to the defence of public order; the disputes over evolutionary theories were 
intense.  The Geological Society of London, founded in 1807, tried to avoid religious 
 
21 Paul Weindling, "Science and Sedition: How Effective were the Acts Licensing Lectures and Meetings, 
1795-1819?," British Journal for the History of Science, 13 (1980), 139-53. 
22 Arnold Thackray, “Natural Knowledge in Cultural Context: the Manchester Model,” American Historical 
Review, 79 (1974), 672-709.  
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politics by focussing on the puzzles of the new stratigraphy.23  Humphry Davy, a protégé 
of radical medical circles in Bristol, moved to the Royal Institution in London and became 
more conservative.  He made spectacular use of one of the first public laboratories, 
becoming the main British actor in European debates about electricity and chemistry.  He 
was also the patron of Michael Faraday, the humble-born philosopher of electricity, who 
proved exemplary both for self-help and for experimental physics.24 
 
Because intellectual commerce with France was disrupted until after Waterloo, the 
revolutionary changes in professional education and museums were little felt in Britain 
until the 1820s, when, for example, medical students began to visit Paris to complete their 
training.  In mathematics, the 1820s saw the “analytical revolution,” which brought French 
mathematical and pedagogical methods to Britain, and especially to the great mathematical 
university of Cambridge.  After the political crisis of Peterloo, when cavalry attacked a 
large crowd of protesters calling for parliamentary reform at St Peter’s Field, Manchester 
in 1819, the provincial middle-classes found their voice again, in part to speak of reforms 
that would head-off the growing threat of working-class disorder.  And when the British 
“ancien regime” ended, symbolically, with the Reform Act of 1832, the new regime in 
 
23 Martin J. S. Rudwick, The Great Devonian Controversy: The Shaping of Scientific Knowledge Among 
Gentlemanly Specialists (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Nicholas Rupke, The Great Chain 
of History: William Buckland and the English School of Geology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). 
24 Jan Golinski, Science as Public Culture: Chemistry and Enlightenment in Britain (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992); Frank A. J. L. James, ‘The Common Purposes of Life’: Science and 
Society at the Royal Institution of Great Britain (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002). 
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London, and especially in the provinces, gave larger roles to merchants, industrialists, and 
professionals.  Many such professionals and activists were keen cultivators of science.  
Indeed, while certain kinds of natural theology and natural philosophy could serve as a 
shield for conservatives, the “science” that spanned the new analytical disciplines was 
becoming a weapon for reformers and radicals alike.25  
 
Medical students and some of their teachers had a reputation for political radicalism, and 
their evolutionary theories encouraged politicised artisans to develop anti-clerical accounts 
of man.26  In the more radical of the Mechanics’ Institutes from the 1820s, and in the 
socialist “Halls of Science” around 1840, evolutionary speculation mixed with versions of 
political economy that stressed property in skills as much as in capital, and with 
phrenological teachings that promised deep knowledge of character.27  Though the working 
classes were sometimes allowed into middle-class museums, many workers with a taste for 
collecting and naming plants exercised their skills in public-houses, to the distress of their 
 
25 Richard Yeo, “William Whewell, Natural Theology and the Philosophy of Science in Mid Nineteenth-
Century Britain,” Annals of Science, 36 (1979), 493-519; Richard Yeo, “William Whewell on the History 
of Science,” Metascience, 5 (1987), 25-40; John H. Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical 
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). On science and reform the classic work is 
Jack Morrell and Arnold Thackray, Gentlemen of Science: Early Years of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
26 Adrian Desmond, The Politics of Evolution: Morphology, Medicine and Reform in Radical London 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989). 
27 Roger Cooter, The Cultural Meaning of Popular Science: Phrenology and the Organisation of Consent 
in Nineteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).  
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would-be patrons who liked to draw a line between drink and self-improvement.28 These 
plebian and radical contexts and doctrines have proved attractive to historians for political 
reasons as well as for the connection with Darwinism, but one should not underestimate 
the opposition – the mobilisation of science by Whigs and liberals, and indeed by 
conservatives.  Most Mechanics’ Institutes were in fact run by middle-class paternalists, 
and their clients were often shop-keepers and clerks seeking advancement.  To approximate 
the laws of liberal political economy to those of Newton lent the former a useful 
inscrutability; and phrenology, for many artisans as for its middle-class adherents, served 
to reinforce individualism.29  And though comparative anatomy could be subversive of 
man’s special status, and the importation of continental medical sciences provided a niche 
for young doctors, the medical profession remained dominated by hospital consultants not 
noted for their intellectual or social concerns.  Public health and “state-medicine” were 
indeed radical causes in the 1830s, but few doctors showed much interest until the 1850s.30 
Whig intellectuals held to middle roads, and from the 1820s they had a London base in 
what became University College (conservatives founded King’s College to bolster 
Anglican claims).   
 
 
28 Anne Secord, “Science in the Pub – Artisan Botanists in Early Nineteenth-Century Lancashire,” History 
of Science, 32 (1994), 269-315. 
29 Barry Barnes and Steve Shapin, Natural Order: Studies of Scientific Culture (London: Sage Publications, 
1979). 
30 Christopher Hamlin, Public Health and Social Justice in the Age of Chadwick; Britain, 1800-1954 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Ivan Waddington, The Medical Profession in the 
Industrial Revolution (Dublin: Humanities Press, 1984). 
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The age of reform was important for science organisationally and institutionally at the 
national level.  Geologists succeeded in establishing the (state) Geological Survey (1835).31 
The Royal Society of London was reformed in 1847 to make it a professionally oriented 
learned society, and new national societies were formed, for example the Astronomical 
Society of London (1820) and the Chemical Society (1841).  Engineers created the 
Institution of Civil Engineers (1818), which covered parliamentary work for transport 
schemes, and the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (1847), which was more provincial 
and industrial in orientation.32  The British Museum was developed as a base for taxonomy 
and comparative anatomy, a new Museum of Practical Geology was linked with the 
Geological Survey, and pathological museums became essential to medical schools -- 
whether private or in the teaching hospitals.  And the provincial enthusiasts so gathered 
were recruited by metropolitan “gentlemen of science” into the new British Association for 
the Advancement of Science, a pressure group consolidated though annual meetings in 
different cities.33  The same pattern of organisation, characteristic of liberal reform, was 
followed by what became the British Medical Association.34 The leaders of the BAAS 
 
31 James A. Secord, “The Geological Survey of Great Britain as a Research School, 1839-1855,” History of 
Science, 24 (1986), 223-75. 
32 Buchanan, The Engineers; Robert Bud and G. K. Roberts, Science versus Practice: Chemistry in 
Victorian Britain (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984); Colin Divall and Sean F. Johnston, 
Scaling Up: The Institution of Chemical Engineers and the Rise of a New Profession (Dordrecht, Boston 
and London: Kluwer Academic, 2000). 
33 Morrell and Thackray, Gentlemen of Science; Rudwick, The Great Devonian Controversy. 
34 Peter Bartrip. Themselves Writ Large: The British Medical Association, 1832-1966 (London: BMJ 
Publishing Group, 1996). 
 14 
mostly held paid posts in the universities; the “British Ass” linked them with the occasional 
lecturers, periodical writers, and with the enthusiasts for natural history, astronomy, 
microscopy or photography who generally met in local scientific societies, and who helped 
constitute the common context of middle-class thought.35  It is notable though that we have 
a shift, from societies attached to place, like the Royal Society of London to organisations 
going by national names, such as the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 
an institution which met once a year in different cities.  As the British world expanded, 
from 1884 it held the occasional meeting outside the United Kingdom, visiting Canada in 
1884 and 1909, South Africa in 1905 and Australia in 1914.   
 
As these examples indicate we are concerned largely with non-state, voluntary activity.  
Indeed what is striking is the extent to which this, and private commercial activity 
connected to science flourished. Commercial and educational museums were set up, often 
in the hope of popularising technology and encouraging invention.36  Not least in great new 
industrial cities, local societies for science flourished.  Manchester, for example, alongside 
its Literary and Philosophical Society (1781), sprouted societies (and museums) for natural 
history, geology, technology, and phrenology, quite independent of the state.   
 
 
35 James Secord, Victorian Sensation: The Extraordinary Publication, Reception and Secret Authorship of 
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
36 Iwan Rhys Morus, Frankenstein's Children: Electricity, Exhibition, and Experiment in Early-Nineteenth-
Century London (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
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Industry and Analysis 
In the early to mid-nineteenth century the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (as 
it then was) was distinctive in its urbanisation and its industrialisation.  Accounts of the 
industrial revolution written in the decades after the Second World War tended to focus on 
the possible inputs of science to industrialisation, and on the origins of the technical 
universities and technical institutions.37  Later historians have stressed the many different 
roles of technical knowledges, latent as well as patent.  They have looked less to industry 
than to civil engineering, government regulation, military and naval forces, medical 
professionalization, and the social roles of the sciences for middle or working-class 
groupings.38  It has been hard to find science merely applied in industry, except in the 
chemical trades, but one might argue more widely -- for common attitudes demonstrated 
in both knowledge-seeking and money-making.  For example, the inventions of textile 
machines by Lancashire artisans might be linked with their contemporary fondness for 
mathematics and botany as the (short-lived) prosperity of domestic hand-loom weavers 
encouraged a culture of self-instruction and an appreciation of “novelties.”  Or, at the level 
 
37 A. E. Musson and E. Robinson, Science and Technology in the Industrial Revolution (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1969); Donald S. L. Cardwell, ed., Artisan to Graduate; Essays to 
Commemorate the Foundation in 1824 of the Manchester Mechanics’ Institution, Now in 1974 the 
University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1974).  This tradition has been revived in Joel Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy: Britain and the 
Industrial Revolution, 1700-1850 (London: Penguin, 2011). 
38 See Margaret C. Jacob, Scientific Culture and the Making of the Industrial West (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997); Golinski, Science as Public Culture; Stewart, The Rise of Public Science. 
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of the urban professionals by the 1820s, we can see chemists, engineers, industrialists, and 
doctors trying to analyse into components of chemical matter, mechanical motions, 
industrial processes, or industrial society, so as to better understand the structures and 
dynamics across the range of the new sciences.  Their analytical methodologies and 
ideologies helped link the rationalisation of industrial production with the political 
economy of Ricardo and with new analyses of the natural world then being produced by 
emergent “scientists.”39 
 
Indeed, the first half of the century, in the United Kingdom, as in France, was notable for 
analytical sciences and practices based on “elements” that were specific to each of these 
newly constituted disciplines.  Lavoisier’s new system of chemical elements was the 
paradigm, but geology, botany, zoology, general anatomy, and engineering all had their 
elements (for example, strata, tissues, and elementary machines) from which bodies of 
various kinds were seen as compounded.40  In the spaces between natural philosophy, 
chemistry, and engineering, new physical disciplines were created around the elements of 
heat, light, and the various kinds of electricity.  As John Herschel noted in the most popular 
guide to scientific method: “In pursuing the analysis of any phenomenon, the moment we 
find ourselves stopped by one of which we perceive no further analysis…the study of that 
 
39 Pickstone, Ways of Knowing, pp. 83-102. The links between political economy and science have been a 
theme of the literature on, for example, Babbage and Kelvin. See also Margaret Schabas, A World Ruled by 
Number: William Stanley Jevons and the Rise of Mathematical Economics (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990). 
40 See Pickstone, Ways of Knowing. 
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phenomenon and of its laws becomes a separate branch of science.”41  It is no accident that 
in Britain as in France, there was much contemporary interest in the classification of the 
sciences, or that traditionalist natural philosophers such as William Whewell regarded the 
new disciplines as too unstable to serve as the basis for a scientific education, which should 
continue to be grounded in mathematical natural philosophy.42 For all these new subjects, 
especially in those fields close to agriculture and industry, for example stratigraphy, 
chemistry, work/energy, and political economy, British analysts were much more than 
copyists.  Whig reformers (and some Tories and Radicals) ranged across these nascent 
disciplines and built them into political arguments. Charles Babbage, who had helped 
introduce French mathematics to Cambridge, also argued for the division and 
mechanisation of mathematical labor; he philosophised about industrial work as he 
lamented the lack of support for science in Britain.43  The physician James Kay (-
Shuttleworth) analysed the social body of Manchester, guided by the physiology he had 
learned at Edinburgh and the political economy of Ricardo; he moved to become a Poor 
Law Commissioner under Edwin Chadwick and then the first central administrator of 
 
41 John Herschel, Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (London: Longman, 1830). 
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English education.44  His Manchester contemporary, the devotee James Prescott Joule, 
applied himself to natural philosophy.  A student of John Dalton and a son of a brewing 
family, Joule was sceptical of the 1830s enthusiasm for electrical machines, so he measured 
their efficiency, as practical engineers had learnt to assess that of steam engines.  From 
these results he went on to conceptualise and measure the mechanical equivalent of heat, 
and so, via William Thomson’s Cambridge mathematics and Glasgow engineering, laid 
one route to the principles of thermodynamics.45  
Fiscal-military State 
If our account is unfamiliar in starting with the land before going on to more familiar 
industry, it is also unusual in looking at the armed services.  Great Britain was, in a 
celebrated historiographical intervention, a “fiscal-military state.”46  It had armed services 
operating across the world from the eighteenth century, at the center of which was the 
Royal Navy, a vast force backed up by industrial installations and educational and technical 
institutions barely known in the civilian world.  Perhaps the most famous institution was 
the Royal Observatory at Greenwich, under the Astronomer Royal, and all under the 
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Admiralty, the navy ministry.47 The Navy engaged and transported the great naturalists of 
the age around the globe, from Sir Joseph Banks, the great panjandrum of British science 
and for decades president of the Royal Society, to Charles Darwin, who sailed on the 
warship HMS Beagle, built at Woolwich Dockyard, and commanded by Robert Fitzroy 
RN, an aristocratic career naval officer and meteorologist, who would go on to create the 
Meteorological Office.48  The army too had its great institutions like the Royal Military 
College (at Sandhurst from 1802), for infantry and cavalry, and the older Royal Military 
Academy, at Woolwich, for engineers and artillery officers. The latter had professors of 
mathematics, and indeed of chemistry, including Michael Faraday. The Royal Society of 
London was full of men from the armed forces, like Sir Francis Beaufort of the Navy, Sir 
Edward Sabine of the artillery (and later President of the Royal Society), Sir George 
Everest, and many others including medical officers of the armed services.  They accounted 
for around 10 percent of the fellowship through the nineteenth century.49 These institutions 
carried out great projects, including massive geodesic projects and great feats of precision 
measurement, from the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India (1802-1871), to the 
establishment of the precise distance between the Observatories of London and Paris, 
 
47 Richard Dunn and Rebekah Higgitt, Finding Longitude (London: Collins, 2014); Sophie Waring, “The 
Board of Longitude and the Funding of Scientific Work: Negotiating Authority and Expertise in the Early 
Nineteenth Century,” Journal for Maritime Research, 16 (2014), 55-71. 
48 Michael S. Reidy, Tides of History: Ocean Science and Her Majesty's Navy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 2008). 
49 Thomas David, “British Scientists and Soldiers in the First World War (with special reference to 
ballistics and chemical warfare),”  (PhD thesis, Imperial College, 2009) 
 20 
making a universal time a reality.50  Yet it is important to note that in the later nineteenth 
century, the state and armed forces loomed much less significantly in Britain than 
elsewhere.  Thus the British military academies had nothing like the status or impact of the 
Ecole Polytechnique in France or the West Point Military Academy in the United States; 
indeed, state civil engineering colleges barely existed in the United Kingdom. From the 
mid-nineteenth century science and scientific education was principally a matter for higher 
civil society rather than state institutions and officials.  State corps of military engineers, 
even naval architects, did not have anything like the same significance as they did in much 
of continental Europe. This is not to say that the state did not have specialist technical 
officers. The latter category included various kinds of public health doctor, chemists 
involved in the Alkali Inspectorate, inspectors of education (for example Matthew Arnold) 
or of Fisheries (a post T. H. Huxley once held).51  
 
Religion and Education in Liberal Britain 
Another important differentiating and complicating factor was religion. The United 
Kingdom was a Protestant nation – Catholics were “emancipated” only in 1829; and its 
established Protestant churches vied with Dissenting churches of many stripes.  This was 
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the context of characteristic science-religion discussions.  Such debates were echoed in the 
United States, but differed significantly from Continental patterns, which more clearly 
pitted atheists and agnostics against Catholicism.52 In the United Kingdom science and 
religions went together, though in varied forms. Darwin was buried in Westminster Abbey 
in 1882.53 The educational institutions in which science flourished were mostly 
denominational; indeed, to be non-denominational much before mid-century was in effect 
a sectarian position.  The key Anglican institutions were Oxford, Cambridge, and Trinity 
College, Dublin. These and other protestant universities emerged as great centers of 
scientific and mathematical learning.  It is notable that most of the great Irish-born 
scientists – including Lord Kelvin, George Stokes, John Tyndall, Joseph Larmor, George 
Francis Fitzgerald, George Johnstone Stoney, and John Joly – were Protestants.54 The 
Scottish Universities and the emergent London University were open to all faiths and more 
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open to the new sciences.  So too were the Queen’s Colleges of the 1840s in Cork, Galway, 
and Belfast, but the Irish Catholic hierarchy banned their flocks from them, leaving Irish 
science almost wholly Protestant.  When we look to T. H. Huxley and his co-conspirators 
in the X-Club, a small group  of like-minded naturalists formed in 1864m we see how an 
emergent scientific community lobbied for influence, power, and the provision of new 
colleges that could accommodate their protégés.55  Their message still has radical 
resonance – science, as a method, embodied the spirit of practical criticism, it questioned 
all tradition, including religion; it was the way of the future.56 
  
From the mid-nineteenth century there was a notable development in formal education, 
mostly private. The growth of formal medical education, in the hospital schools of London 
as in the proprietary medical colleges of the provinces, gave partial livings to teachers of 
chemistry, natural philosophy, and botany, as well as of the new medical sciences.57  And 
from the 1840s, in London, medical students could also attend a new kind of college for 
scientific professionals: at the Royal College of Chemistry, A. W. von Hofmann brought 
to Britain the practical education in chemistry (and pharmacy) pioneered by Justus von 
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Liebig at the University of Giessen.58  The College failed as a private venture, becoming 
part of the complex of scientific institutions supported from mid-century by the state and 
mostly collected into South Kensington, which, for all its debts to (the German) Prince 
Albert, was in many ways the French aspect of British science, a set of national educational 
museums and technical schools. 
 
From mid-century, pressures mounted to reform the ancient universities.  Reformers inside 
the universities hoped to benefit their disciplines by professionalising academic life and 
promoting research, as in Germany.  Many of the external reformers were provincial 
Dissenters, keen to open up the ancient English universities for the next generation.  Similar 
campaigns were mounted for the reform of the élite boarding schools – for the better moral-
discipline of young English gentlemen and to maintain the intellectual legitimations of that 
social class against the claims to new knowledge evident in the northern cities and the 
technical professions.59   
 
In the northern cities, the higher education institutes most characteristic of the early century 
had been denominational colleges for clergy of various Dissenting kinds.  From mid-
century, secular colleges were founded, some of them (for example, in Manchester, and 
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later Liverpool) with traditional curricula that contained arts subjects as well as sciences.  
Some, like Sheffield and Birmingham, concentrated on the sciences that were to benefit 
local industries.  Some came close to failure, but by about 1870 they were thriving.  
Leading local industrialists were supporting academic entrepreneurs in developing science 
laboratories, especially for chemistry; and proprietary medical schools were amalgamating 
with the colleges, in part to secure the pre-clinical science teaching that medical 
educationists had managed to make compulsory under the 1858 Medical Act.  Generally, 
the colleges benefited from the growth of a “diploma culture” -- the University of London 
acting as a national examination board.60 
 
Most professional scientists around mid-century curated museums or analyzed specimens 
for knowledge, diagnoses, or profit; they also lectured to large classes and performed 
demonstrations.  Even T. H. Huxley, the Moses of experimental biology in Britain, did his 
own taxonomic and analytical biology in museums or in the field; and though many 
younger scientists owed their positions to him, he had no direct research descendants such 
as they would later boast. The growth of higher education in mid-century boosted the 
museum sciences.  Thus the first major scientific institution in Oxford was the University 
Museum (of Natural History, with chemistry added on) promoted by Ruskin and opened 
in 1861.  In London, the Royal School of Mines was associated with the Museum of 
Practical Geology; and when T. H. Huxley built the Normal School of Science in South 
Kensington to educate science teachers, it too contained a museum.  In the 1870s the 
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Natural History collections of the British Museum were moved to a splendid new Gothic 
cathedral of science in South Kensington; and from about the same date, throughout the 
country, municipal governments were developing public museums, often incorporating 
collections that had been assembled by local natural history societies and were used by the 
new civic colleges.61 
 
Yet even as museums gained huge public audiences, they began to be marginalised in the 
academies, where from the 1860s professors of physical sciences concentrated on 
developing laboratories.  These were first intended for the instruction of students, but some 
later housed organised research by advanced students and staff.  Chemistry had led the way 
with the teaching laboratories of Thomas Thomson in Glasgow, and Hofmann in London.  
And when Owens College, Manchester raised money for extension and moved to its 
present site in the early 1870s, about half the space in the new building was devoted to 
Henry Roscoe’s chemical institute – as large as anything in Germany and closely linked 
with local industry via consultancies and the provision of graduates.62  Physics followed.  
Glasgow boasted a physics laboratory created by William Thomson to give practical 
training to large numbers of students, while also serving his industrial connections, 
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especially for telegraphy, which demanded laboratory testing and skilled technicians.63  
Indeed historians have fruitfully explored the connections of electrical telegraphy – 
particularly submarine telegraphy – with the emergent British physics and electro-magnetic 
theory.64 
 
The Cambridge pattern was interestingly different from that of London and the industrial 
provinces, with less stress on chemistry. It was not only important but huge relatively 
speaking: in mid-century some 100 students graduated in mathematics from Cambridge 
each year.  Though most of these graduates went on to non-mathematical careers, Kelvin, 
James Clerk Maxwell, Stokes, and many other luminaries of science were numbered 
amongst the products:  Cambridge mathematicians represent one of the main British 
contributions to nineteenth-century science.65 The Cavendish laboratory was funded by the 
Duke of Devonshire (family name Cavendish), who was also a mathematician, an 
industrialist, and a statesman for science, and who, in the early 1870s, chaired a massive 
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enquiry into the state of British science, an indication that the scientific resources of the 
nation had become an important issue.  Its many recommendations largely went unfunded, 
but the institution he gave to Cambridge, sometimes then called a museum for physical 
science, proved crucial in diverting some of Cambridge’s mathematical prowess towards 
experimentalism.  The Cavendish failed to take off as a teaching laboratory until the mid 
eighties but became a center for analytical work on electrical standards, closely related to 
the telegraph industry.  From the 1890s it was a major experimentalist laboratory with a 
program of research around cathode ray tubes, led by J. J. Thomson.66  From 1895, when 
Cambridge laboratories were opened to graduates from elsewhere, they proved attractive 
to colonial scholarship boys as well as to rich Britons.67 Another hugely productive 
Cambridge laboratory was the Cambridge physiological laboratory, dating also from the 
1870s.    
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By about 1890, “endowment of research” featured in funding campaigns for universities, 
and schools of advanced students working under key researchers were the norm in most 
disciplines by about 1900.  But, like the endowment of universities for teaching, and quite 
unlike the German model, the endowment of research laboratories in British universities 
was largely a matter of private philanthropy.68  So too was the provision of new teaching 
hospitals that sometimes accompanied the new universities, and which emphasized 
research and education as well as care. Medical research, especially around bacteriology, 
became a favored object for philanthropy, in hospitals, universities, and a few independent 
institutions.69 As in the United States from the same period, crucial large donations often 
came from the fortunes of industrialist and merchants -- for example, the legacy of Joseph 
Whitworth, the Manchester engineer, which helped provide a new technical college and a 
teaching hospital, as well as an art gallery and scholarships for would-be engineers.  
 
By the end of the nineteenth century science in the United Kingdom could be characterised 
as essentially a private rather than a state activity, but something which was nevertheless 
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of national concern. As Lyell, Darwin, and Joule resoundingly showed, men of independent 
means or commercial employment conducted scientific research work of major 
importance. In London by the later nineteenth century, science was a matter of 
interconnecting networks of educationalists, consultants, businessmen, and researchers.70   
And while science as an activity might be called more professional (though the term needs 
to be used with great caution) it was also in some sense more concentrated in particular 
institutions, which were now very clearly institutions of larger scale than before, much 
more urban, and much more connected to industry that in the eighteenth or early nineteenth 
centuries.  And though not all scientists (a word one can begin to use, though man of 
science was a much more common designation) were not all liberals, in some larger sense 
science and liberalism marched together. A small state, as the British state had become, 
played a relatively much smaller role in the sciences than on the Continent, a source of 
pride to many of its great luminaries.  
 
Education, Industry, and Empire (1890-1914) 
The years around 1900 saw a rapidly expanding provision for higher scientific and 
technical education.  Campaigners tended to ignore the existing, very varied provision for 
education, and its rapid development, in a variety of forms, and typically supported by 
philanthropy.  The general increase in the quality of scientific and technical education was 
evidenced by the disappearance from British firms of foreign and foreign-trained scientists 
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and engineers.  A crude estimate would suggest that the number of annual graduates in 
science and engineering increased fourfold in twenty years.71  But in some cases there was 
an explicit rejection of the German model of provision, and comparisons with continental 
countries need to be carefully made.  For example, whilst on the continent most 
universities, higher technical schools, and medical schools were wholly owned by the state 
(in Germany not the Reich but the state governments), this was rarely the case in Britain, 
where the universities were mostly charitable corporations.  The exceptions were the new 
technical colleges owned by the major cities and towns, plus the rather special case of the 
Royal College of Science, which incorporated the Royal School of Mines, together with 
the private City and Guilds College, and was later transferred (1907) from the ownership 
of the Board of Education to the new Imperial College of Science and Technology.  Ireland 
too had a state-run Royal College of Science in Dublin, in a building later taken over by 
the government of the Free State.  In another important respect the German model was not 
followed.  Britain, with some partial exceptions, integrated engineering into universities, 
rejecting the continental model of separate engineering schools.72  And from about 1870, 
British medical schools, which had tended to be separate from universities except in 
Scotland, became increasingly integrated into universities, first in the provinces and later 
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in London.  Many of the rapidly growing “civic” universities were given independent 
charters in this period, with the right to examine their own students.  Their income came 
from central and local government, from private donations and endowments, and from 
student fees (some covered by local government scholarships).73  Some one-third of their 
students studied medicine. As in much else in this period, the key unit of analysis was not 
so much the United Kingdom, but rather the Empire, of which the United Kingdom was a 
key part.  As far as education and science was concerned the key parts were the white 
dominions, which themselves had great British universities, including McGill in Canada, 
and universities/colleges in Cape Town, Otago, Christchurch, and Sydney.74 Thus is was 
possible for Ernest Rutherford, who graduated in New Zealand, to undertake further study 
at Cambridge, then to teach at McGill and then Manchester, before returning to Cambridge 
in 1919.  
 
Most of the scientists, engineers, and medics produced did standard forms of scientific, 
technical, and medical work.  But these years, in Britain as elsewhere, saw a research 
revolution, though one less well-known and understood than comparable developments in 
Germany and the United States. This research revolution brought research not only into 
universities as a general expectation in elite institutions, but also, simultaneously, into 
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government and industrial scientific and technical services.75 These developments were 
driven in part at least by a lobby for science advocating state support of both higher 
education and research, and the reform of the state along more technocratic lines.76  
 
All the universities during this period saw themselves as at least in part research 
institutions. We have already noted two Cambridge cases; in London, University College 
had research schools around William Ramsay in chemistry and Karl Pearson in statistics, 
to take but two.  In Manchester, by the Edwardian period, there were strong research 
schools -- in chemistry under W. H. Perkin, and in physics under Schuster and then 
Rutherford.77 The key British figure in bacteriology, Sir Almroth Wright, funded his 
extensive research program at the voluntary St. Mary’s Hospital, London not only by his 
individualistic private practice but also through philanthropic donations and the 
manufacture of vaccines.78  
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Research in microbiology, parasitology, entomology, and mycology were central to that 
other great motor of science ca. 1900 – the “constructive imperialism,” which was meant 
to extend British political and economic power in Africa and Asia (and parts of South 
America).  In Liverpool, research in tropical medicine and associate disciplines were 
funded by local ship-owners; in London, the School of Tropical Medicine was government-
led.79  We know less about the effects of constructive imperialism on physical sciences and 
engineering.80 Research on matters of concern to the state, often partly financed by the 
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state, was a notable feature of these years. The National Physical Laboratory (1900) was 
financed not just by government but also by fees and private donations.81  
 
For medical science, Britain had struggled to found a research institute (eventually the 
Lister Institute) comparable to the Pasteur Institute in Paris, but as concern with infant 
mortality mounted at the start of the new century, medical research appeared as one means 
of building a larger, healthier population, and hence a more efficient state.  A Medical 
Research Committee, formed under the 1911 National Insurance Act, was expected to 
focus on tuberculosis but was soon dominated by Cambridge physiologists who helped 
establish a presence within government for the elites of British science and education.  But 
here again, mixed finance was crucial.  Cancer research was supported by two charities 
established for that purpose (in 1899 and then in 1923).82  
 
The backwardness of British businesses in research in this period, and indeed later, has 
been exaggerated in an older historiography overly influenced by contemporary complaints 
and crude assumptions about the link between research and economic development.83  The 
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much-analysed loss of synthetic dyes/drugs production to Germany should be seen in 
context – Germany, for all its graduate chemists, then had little else in the way of chemical 
industry, and no other country (except Switzerland) developed major research-led firms in 
this field before the Great War.  Yet it is necessary to recognise the significance, in Britain 
as elsewhere, of the entry of foreign firms, most notably in the newest industries.  Already 
before the Great War, General Electric, Westinghouse, Ford Motor Company, and Eastman 
Kodak had large British operations, as did some firms of German origin, including 
Siemens.84  Through Henry Dale, the Cambridge bio-medical elite was linked to the 
Wellcome Physiological Laboratories, supported by Wellcome’s pharmaceutical company. 
These enterprises were established in a free-trading space:  Britain was the greatest exporter 
and importer in the world, trading mainly with Europe and the richer parts of the Americas 
and Australasia. British industrialists organised research in many fields, from heavy 
chemicals to dyestuffs, from pharmaceuticals to explosives, often drawing on German 
models established twenty years earlier.85   
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In agriculture, state funding for research was seen as an alternative to “tariff reform” – a 
means of boosting British interests without sacrificing the principle of free trade.  
Agricultural science was developed together with rural roads through the agency of the 
Development Commission created in 1909, and some of the money went to the private 
Rothamsted experimental station.86    
 
The decades around 1900 saw a global arms race, and in the armed services too one sees a 
concern with research and experimentation, as well as the entry of university-trained 
civilian researchers into military and naval laboratories, including the new Research 
Department at the Woolwich Arsenal (1902) and the Royal Aircraft Factory (1909). 87 The 
dreadnought and super-dreadnought battleships, combining heavy guns and armour plate 
with analogue computers, elaborate range-finders, radio, oil-burning boilers, steam 
turbines, and much else, were the creation of the Royal Navy and private arms industry, 
which was clearly investing in research before the Great War.88  In industry more generally, 
there were many examples of laboratories being established for the development of new 
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products and processes.  Sheffield steel provides a clear example of the development of 
research before 1914 in a field usually condemned for technical backwardness.   
 
In political discussions, technical experts were heard at the highest levels, and some 
political-intellectual movements, for example the Fabian Society, embraced a notably 
scientistic form of politics.  Party leaders with an interest in science included R. B. Haldane, 
the noted liberal lawyer (and brother of the physiologist J. S. Haldane), who was a leading 
figure in university reform, army reform, and the law; and on the conservative side was 
Arthur Balfour, who was closely connected to Cambridge science.  Moreover, a strongly 
nationalistic/imperialistic, technocratic, and anti-democratic scientific lobby existed in the 
Edwardian years: national efficiency was the watchword for many reform campaigns, 
including the eugenics movement which sought to limit the reproduction of the lowest 
classes, attributing their plight to biological, transmissible inferiority.89  Unlike the United 
States, British eugenics was mostly about class rather than race – though Jewish 
immigration was an issue.  Many public health doctors regarded talk of national 
degeneration as mythical, and British eugenicists preferred to segregate the mentally 
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subnormal rather than sterilise them; but from ca. 1900 through to the 1930s, selective 
breeding was attractive politics on the left as well as the right.90 
 
The Great War and After 
The weakness of Britain’s science-based industry on the eve of the Great War was singled 
out by scientists at the time, and by historians since, as the cause of relative German 
success.91  Worse still, the government was prepared to send scientists to the front to die 
as common soldiers -- the case of the physicist Henry Moseley became iconic.92  The state, 
in this account, belatedly responded by creating a Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research, which then continued into the peace.93  But that story underestimated the 
centrality of the pre-war military departments and the wartime Ministry of Munitions, and 
indeed that the pre-war British state had hardly neglected the development of weapons of 
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war.94  As we have seen that view of the state of affairs before 1914, prominent as it remains 
in accounts of science in the Great War, is untenable. Yet the older historiography repeated 
these claims, and focussed on new bodies with limited roles, which had “science” in their 
titles. The action, however, had been and remained elsewhere, and needs to be traced in 
works concerning these institutions, rather than those concerned with science policy.95 
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Much of the scientific mobilisation needs to be understood as a response to characteristics 
of the war that could hardly have been anticipated rather than as a failure to invest in 
research pre-war.  It was a long war, in which Britain was forced to send a mass army, then 
a conscript army, to the Western Front. It was forced to produce many things it thought 
best to leave to Germany and its future allies, from synthetic dyes to scientific glassware.  
On the battlefield it had to cope with unprecedented casualties and new weapons such as 
gas.96  
 
War had been good for research.  New linkages had been forged, and through a great variety 
of state institutions -- whether old, reformed or new -- more money became available.  And 
despite the economic problems of the interwar years, the research enterprise developed 
strongly.  Growth was slower than in the Edwardian years, and there were few institutional 
innovations, yet the change of scale of activity was very significant.  The British armed 
services created large staffs of civilian researchers collaborating (and sometimes 
competing) with the technical arms of the forces.  Directors of Scientific Research were 
appointed for the Navy (1920) and the Air Force (1925), though not until 1938 for the 
Army.  Some of the defence laboratories were much bigger than academic laboratories, for 
example, the Research Department at Woolwich, the Royal Aircraft Establishment at 
 
96 Roger Cooter, Surgery and Society in Peace and War: Orthopaedics and the Organisation of Modern 
Medicine, 1880-1948 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993); Roger Cooter, Mark Harrison, and Steve Sturdy, 
eds., Medicine and the Management of Modern Warfare (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999); Roger Cooter, War, 
Medicine and Modernity (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998).  
 41 
Farnborough, and the chemical warfare establishment at Porton Down.97  And the 
continued expansion of the empire, together with the greater imperial orientation of trade, 
supported the development of research in many other fields, from food preservation to 
locust control, funded by a variety of institutions including the Empire Marketing Board.98  
New means of communication also benefited; imperialism, radio, and aviation proved 
highly synergistic.99  Even whaling was scientized.100  
 
Britain was no longer so committed to free trade, and the once-dreaded Protection became 
a key feature of economic life.  Like many new industries of the 1920s, dyestuffs grew up 
 
97 On interwar warlike R&D see David Zimmerman, Britain’s Shield: Radar and the Defeat of the 
Luftwaffe (London: Sutton, 2000); Rob Evans, Gassed: British Chemical Warfare Experiments on Humans 
at Porton Down (London: House of Stratus, 2000); Edgerton, Warfare State, chap. 3. 
98 Michael Worboys, “Science and British Colonial Imperialism”; Michael Worboys, “British Colonial 
Science Policy, 1918-1939,” in Les Sciences Coloniales: Figures and Institutions, ed. P. Petitjean (Paris: 
ORSTOM, 1996), pp. 99-112; Michael Worboys, “The Imperial Institute, the State and the Development of 
the Natural Resources of the Colonial Empire, 1887-1923,” in Imperialism and the Natural World, ed. John 
M. Mackenzie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp. 164-86; Michael Worboys, “Science 
and the British Colonial Empire, 1895-1940,” in Science and Empire, ed. Deepak Kumar (New Delhi: 
NISTAD, 1990), pp. 13-27; Peder Anker, Imperial Ecology: Environmental Order in the British Empire, 
1895-1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
99 Daniel Headrick, The Invisible Weapon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); David Edgerton, 
England and the Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological Nation (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1991). 
100 D. Graham Burnett, Sounding of the Whale (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
 42 
behind selective import controls.101  Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), formed in 1926 by 
the merger of three firms based mainly in the north of England and Scotland, dominated 
heavy chemicals, explosives, and dyestuffs, and was the largest research-performing firm 
in the country.  Its big projects were in synthetic ammonia (to provide fertilisers for the 
empire) and coal hydrogenation (to use surplus coal and produce a domestic source of 
petrol); it recruited its main chemists from Oxford and its engineers from Cambridge.  The 
large electrical concerns, such as Metro-Vickers, GEC, and British Thomson Houston, 
were also notable for their research and development (R&D), but almost all large 
manufacturing concerns undertook some research by the later 1930s, mostly in specially 
assigned laboratories. Characterisations of British industrial research effort in this period 
as deficient, over-dependent on “research associations” funded by the DSIR (Department 
of Scientific and Industrial Research, an institution established by the government at the 
beginning of the First World War to support and help coordinate scientific industrial 
research) and failing to follow the German and especially U.S. model of large corporate 
research laboratories, seem to derive from underestimates of the scale of industrial research 
 
101L. F. Haber, “Government Intervention at the Frontiers of Science: British Dyestuffs and Synthetic 
Organic Chemistry 1914-1939,” Minerva, 11 (1973), 79-94. 
 43 
and its significance for British firms.102 The real scale and scope of interwar research is not 
evident in the campaigns of the interwar scientists’ movement.103 
Much of the better-known government-funded research was effectively controlled 
by civilian scientists who sat on the Medical Research Council (MRC), the Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research, and the Development Commission, founded before or 
during the war.104  Importantly, and controversially, such bodies were attached to the 
center of government, rather than to ministries with specific functions; they enjoyed an 
autonomy denied to research divisions that reported directly to the military ministries or 
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the new Ministry of Health.105  All the research councils placed a great emphasis on what 
they called “fundamental” science, a term with a particular meaning.106  Some of the 
research they funded was carried out in universities, some in semi-private institutions like 
the Rothamsted agricultural laboratories or the Lister (medical) Institute, and some in 
laboratories owned by the funding agencies themselves, the largest of which was the 
National Physical Laboratory (now firmly within government, under the DSIR).107  Both 
contemporaries and historians have asked whether there was much connection between 
this “fundamental” state-science and the practices of the hospital, the farm, and the 
factory.108  Many leading clinicians were suspicious of the MRC and resentful of its 
condescension towards the “empiricism” of practice; they believed research ought to be 
led by clinical problems, whereas the MRC expected medical improvement to flow from 
laboratory experimentation and analysis as exemplified by the (Canadian) discovery of 
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insulin.  To extend their research ethos into medical practice, the MRC pushed for 
research clinicians to be appointed to University hospitals, and they used American 
precedents and funds. But since private consultant practice was much more remunerative 
than professorial salaries, clinical research remained marginal in Britain until the 
establishment of the National Health Service (NHS) after WWII.109  For example, though 
the MRC could point to successes in the small medical school at Sheffield, in the larger 
provincial schools such as Manchester, advocates of salaried clinical research were 
repeatedly frustrated by financial stringency and by the reluctance of their protégés to 
reduce their private practices. Much of the research in medical schools was funded 
though philanthropic foundations based on new industrial money.  The Rockefeller 
Foundation (based in the United States) promoted public health programs, clinical 
research, and the application of physics and chemistry to the understanding of living 
materials.110  William Morris, the Oxford car manufacturer who set up the Nuffield Trust, 
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was especially generous to his local University.  It seems that in the late 1930s the MRC 
and charities each contributed about £200,000 per annum to medical research.111 
 
From the 1920s, the elite universities also received substantial funding from central 
government, including the University Grants Committee and the “research councils,”112 
and with increased funding came a much larger scale of university research.  By the 1930s, 
as J. D. Bernal noted, British university laboratories housed around 1500 research students 
and some 100 research fellows.113  These, however, were distributed very unevenly both 
between subjects and between sites; research was largely in “science” rather than 
“technology.”  Chemistry, physics, and mathematics were favored, and there were great 
differences between universities.  The strength of Cambridge was quantitative as well as 
qualitative; it became the center of pure science, famous for nuclear physics in the 
Cavendish laboratory, and for physiology and its new daughter, biochemistry.  In chemistry 
the key centers now included Oxford, as well as the large civic universities and London; 
most of the department heads had trained outside Oxbridge, and often also in Germany.  
By the mid-thirties, University College London’s chemistry laboratory had two professors, 
two readers, two senior lecturers, and seven lecturers; it turned out more than ten PhDs 
every year.114  
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One important consequence of industrial shifts and the greater involvement of the central 
state in teaching and research was a geographical redistribution of research and innovation.  
By comparison with the nineteenth century, Scotland now figured less strongly as a site for 
research and the development of new industries.  The great civic universities of the north 
of England also lost some proportionate strength with the decline of their older local trades 
and the spread of new industries in the midlands and the south.  Industrial combines with 
headquarters in London tended to build their laboratories in the south east, which is where 
most of the government’s military and civil laboratories were located, including those for 
medicine and agriculture.  As business came to be recognised as a graduate career, so major 
companies became more involved with socially elite universities, and the late Victorian 
linkage of useful-science with the provinces weakened.  All these tendencies benefited 
Oxford and Cambridge, where academic modernisers were keen to recruit research school 
leaders, often from the provinces. 
 
The culture of independent Ireland was notably less scientific than that of Scotland or 
indeed Wales, despite the efforts of the mathematician President Eamonn De Valera and 
his Dublin Institute of Advanced Studies.  After 1922, the new Irish Free State dropped out 
of the British funding system but failed to establish a strong research base of its own.  Its 
favored universities were dominated by nationalists and Catholics with little sympathy for 
the largely Protestant “modernisers,” or for the persistently protestant tradition of Trinity 
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College, Dublin.  Irish nationalism chose to pursue policies that directly and indirectly 
distanced Irish nationalism from science,115 and scientific Irishmen still tended to seek 
careers in Britain – J. D. Bernal and E. T. Walton being important cases.116 
 
In the later nineteenth century, most science graduates went into teaching; only chemistry 
had afforded substantial professional employment for its practitioners.  By the interwar 
period, physics and biomedical disciplines were also recognised as scientific professions, 
providing manpower not just for research but for all the monitoring that was becoming 
integral to medicine and agriculture as well as new industry.  The vast majority of industrial 
scientists were occupied with analytical work and quality control; and the research councils 
had large programs on standardisation – for example the MRCs concern with the 
standardisation of biological therapies such as vaccines and insulin.  Nor should we neglect 
the colonial natural historical surveys and pest management programs for empire.117 
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Private philanthropic endeavours still mattered in the interwar years.118 By the interwar 
years neither the industrial chemist nor the secondary school science teacher, nor the 
imperial agricultural or forestry officer was a novelty; they were established roles in a 
growing technical middle class, about which we know little.  A significant proportion of 
them were women, especially in the biological sciences, though until after WWII marriage 
usually prevented further employment.  Science, one could say, was now a mode of 
employment, not just an interest, a school subject or a form of belief.  
 
Associations with new industries such as chemicals, aviation, electricity, and radio, 
increased the ascendancy of science, though it is worth noting that the rate of growth of 
universities was much lower than for the period 1890-1914.  And for some industrialists 
and politicians a scientific approach to industry seemed to offer an escape from the deep 
class antagonisms evident from ca. 1916 to the failed General Strike of 1926.  Alfred Mond, 
one of the founders of giant chemical firm ICI gave his name to plans for corporate 
rationalisation and constructive engagement with labor -- a centrist program that could also 
be seen in parts of the scientific community.119  In the 1920s, Britain, as a victorious power, 
was no longer threatened by Germany; the challenges and the models for the old country 
now came increasingly from the United States, not least from its industry and its industrial 
funding for research. 
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The 1930s were a different matter, as the depression undermined the legitimacy of laissez 
faire capitalism and provided a startling contrast between the collapsing liberal powers and 
the transformed powers of continental Europe: Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.  For 
some younger academic scientists, as for intellectuals more generally, the 1930s were a 
decade of mobilisation, theoretical experimentation, and action.  Britain produced a 
remarkable group of scientist-activists – including Lancelot Hogben, Herman Levy, J. D. 
Bernal, Patrick Blackett, J. B. S. Haldane and Joseph Needham.120  Though they were 
always a minority, the scientific left of the 1930s were part of a vibrant new “Anglo-
marxist” culture,121 and the accounts they wrote of British science and technology proved 
influential in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet it is important not to overlook the great significance 
of liberal and liberal internationalist thinking and practice in relation to science and 
technology in the interwar years.122 
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The Second World War 
For the Second World War as for the Great War, the old standard story of British science 
centers on the drafting of academic scientists into the war effort, now with a particular 
emphasis on radar, the atomic bomb, and “operational research.”123  Again this account 
neglected pre-existing military scientific organisations, though these were much larger in 
1939 than in 1914.124 For the Second World War a small number of academic scientists, 
plus large numbers of recent graduates, were recruited into pre-existing R&D programs, 
which were hugely expanded.  Most of the famous innovations in military technique came 
from state servants and their new recruits, rather than from seconded academics: radar was 
developed by government radio experts; the jet engine by civil servants and an RAF officer, 
Frank Whittle; and sonar (ASDIC) by naval scientists.  Many academics and young 
scientists were also recruited into long established projects in aeronautics, poison gas, 
explosives, ballistics, and so on.  In distinct contrast to the United States, the universities 
did not become major R&D contractors; military R&D was carried out almost exclusively 
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in government laboratories and private firms.  Universities continued essentially as 
teaching bodies, turning out graduates, often on accelerated courses.125 
 
The standard accounts also overestimate the role of high profile academics like Bernal, 
Blackett, and Zuckerman.  They were involved primarily in operational research, which 
was peripheral to the main R&D effort, where academic scientists rarely held the top 
posts.126  Though academic scientists came to head the old Woolwich research department, 
which would later create the British atomic bomb, and the army radar effort, newer 
enterprises such as the Telecommunications Research Establishment (the key radar 
laboratory) and the Royal Aircraft Establishment remained in the hands of pre-war 
scientific civil servants.127 
 
Industry was also involved, even in the most academic of wartime innovations – penicillin 
and the atomic bomb.  Consider penicillin, where an initially fruitless discovery by 
Alexander Fleming at a London voluntary (charity) hospital was taken up in Oxford by 
Howard Florey in his MRC-funded survey of natural antibacterial substances.  The project 
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was then boosted by war-time funding and transferred to industry for production.  The 
British pharmaceutical companies and ICI were closely involved and produced penicillin 
on a substantial scale, but U.S. universities and companies were able to steal a march, and 
establish patents, through their greater experience of large-scale fermentation.128  The 
British bomb project was also conducted both in university laboratories (with a high 
proportion of refugee scientists) and in industry (with ICI taking a leading role); indeed, 
within government, the project was run by an ICI, Oxford-trained chemist.129  This huge 
project was also later transferred to the United States and Canada, where major industrial 
corporations and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers both played important roles.  Yet the 
biggest and most neglected projects were in the aircraft industry, for example in the 
development of many different types of jet engine. 130 
 
However produced, the results became icons of British brilliance, and they helped give 
science and technology a new place in public culture.  Science was respected, even feared.  
For the MRC, penicillin was strong evidence for the support of basic research and for 
national planning; for many others it became a tale of national loss through failure to 
control exploitation; and at the end of the war, when the NHS was imminent and the 
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nationalisation of the chemical industry a real possibility, Fleming’s discovery was used in 
defence of British voluntarism.131   
 
As never before, Britain saw itself as a scientific nation, and the arguments for more science 
in national life, associated particularly with the scientific left, became truisms.132  The 
wartime expansion of research activity continued into the peace and was linked to a similar 
growth in development, indeed they came closer together, as the increasing use of the term 
“research and development” or R&D suggested.  The challenges and models for Britain 
now lay in the new superpowers -- the United States and the Soviet Union.  Into the early 
1960s, British expenditure on scientific R&D (relative to output) was a good third behind 
the superpowers, though well in advance of the former great powers.  
 
The Nationalization of Research and Development 
Most studies of post-war Britain are organised round the “rise of the welfare state,” but, 
for the promotion of research, welfare was less important than warfare and the industrial 
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development that was partly driven by nationalistic economic policies.  Imports were 
systematically discouraged, and local designs and supplier sources preferentially used.133  
Science and the nation, science and nationalism, marched together. Perhaps the key feature 
of the post-Second World War years was the dominance of the national government -- 
through a greatly expanded military sector together with the nationalisation of public 
utilities, key industries such as coal and steel, and the hospitals. National agriculture was 
expanded very significantly by direct and indirect subsidy, including money for scientific 
research; even in plant breeding, government funding came to dominate the four important 
institutions that had in the past received only part of their income from the state.134  And 
the new Colonial Research Council spent more than the MRC or the Agricultural Research 
Council,135 partly because of the drive for the better exploitation of raw materials, 
symbolised by the ambitious African groundnut scheme of the late 1940s, part of the 
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“second colonisation” of Africa.136  The years after the Second World War were the great 
years of scientific research and scientific extension services in the Empire.137 
 
In the first two post-war decades Britain maintained very high R&D spending – civilian 
and military, public and private – and compared with the rest of Western Europe its higher 
education system was peculiarly oriented towards science and technology.  The proportion 
of national income devoted to R&D was much higher than that of any capitalist nation 
other than the United States, and British businesses were second only to those of the United 
States in absolute and relative commitment to industrial research.138  From 1945 to 1974 
British scientists won, on average, more than one Nobel Prize each year, a much better 
record than in the first half of the century.  But, for all this strength, who could doubt that 
the world center of scientific, technical, and medical innovation had passed from Europe 
to the United States? America, much more than Britain was the model for post-war 
scientific reconstruction in continental Europe; and it became common for young British 
researchers to spend time in the United States. 
 
But at the end of the war, the scale of British warlike research and development hardly 
diminished as the government committed to new generations of armaments, including 
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nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; demobilisation was minimal.  And from around 
1950, rearmament brought huge increases in military R&D spending, overwhelmingly in 
government and industry.139  As a result, in the mid-1950s some 80 percent of government 
R&D, and 60 percent of all British R&D was military.  Though most was done in industry, 
national laboratories became increasingly important.  The civil atomic program was 
developed in a new state laboratory at Harwell, while the bomb was designed at the army’s 
main research laboratory, and then at a new state laboratory at Aldermaston.  At Porton 
Down, work on chemical warfare was supplemented with an important program on 
biological weapons.140  The aeronautical and electronic laboratories were also expanded.  
Again and again we find the belief that brilliant Britain could design innovative aeroplanes, 
nuclear reactors, and electronic devices that would leapfrog the more intensive but 
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plodding efforts of the Americans.141 Those in charge were government scientists not 
academics.142  In 1949 Britain clearly considered itself the second great technological 
power, but the explosion of the Soviet atomic device in that year led to some downgrading 
of this assessment. 
 
It is sometimes argued that this expenditure on weapons was at the expense of bread and 
butter civil development, and that Germany and Japan, no longer world powers, were able 
to outspend Britain on such R&D; however, this common place of commentary is 
untenable.143  Industrially funded research and development boomed from the end of the 
war, and into the mid-1960s it was absolutely and relatively greater than that of German or 
Japanese industry.144  Furthermore, British industry distributed its effort across different 
fields in much the same way as the Germans and the Japanese.  
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Many of the new clinical researchers collaborated with the pharmaceutical companies, 
which greatly expanded their research activities; ICI moved into pharmaceuticals, 
including new anaesthetics, partly from its experience in the war-time collaborations over 
fluorine chemistry and penicillin.145  A wartime committee on medical education proved 
successful in boosting pre-clinical sciences in universities, thus strengthening research as 
well as teaching. However, it proved less successful in its advocacy of “social medicine,” 
a discipline meant to incorporate social sciences into clinical medicine and so rescue public 
health from the local authority medical-bureaucrats.146  The MRC was particularly keen to 
support biophysics and helped several war-time physicists to enter this new field, so 
encouraging the x-ray crystallography and membrane physiology for which Cambridge and 
London Universities, especially, were already known.147  They also funded much more 
clinical research and helped build up academic departments in teaching hospitals.  Some 
of these departments then collaborated with the pharmaceutical companies, developing 
antibiotics and then new drugs for psychiatric and cardio-vascular diseases. For the first 
time, Britain was now a major player in the international drug industry.148  
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The 1960s and 1970s saw important changes in the administration of government research. 
Perhaps the most important was the shift of control from scientific organisations to 
mainline ministries. Thus the DSIR was broken up, with much going to the Ministry of 
Technology, while the remainder went, as a research council, along with the others, into 
the Department of Education and Science. For the government laboratories the mid-1960s 
saw the beginning of retrenchment and increasing control by users. In 1970 the Labour 
government proposed the creation of a British Research and Development Corporation to 
be funded largely on a contract basis, covering most civil research. It did not happen, but 
following the Rothschild Report, the customer-contractor principle was formally applied 
to government-funded applied research in the departments. It is telling that on the defence 
side 1971 saw the setting up of a Procurement Executive, tasked with being an intelligent 
customer of material and research. The Rothschild Report endorsed the research council 
system, outside the customer-contractor principle, with two exceptions. These were that a 
small proportion of the research of two research councils, in agriculture and health, should 
be done under contract from the relevant ministries.149 This proposal has led to the 
erroneous belief that Rothschild represents a major break in research policy (meaning here 
policy for the research councils), an overturning of something called the “Haldane 
Principle.” It did not, and in fact the Haldane Principle, meaning something like scientists’ 
control of government funded research, was an invention of the 1960s. Rightly, Rothschild 
had noted that the so-called Haldane Principle was not relevant.  
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The ”Haldane Principle” was invented in 1964 by  Lord Hailsham, as something that was 
being violated in 1964 with the disbandment of the DSIR and the removal of the Lord 
President from control of the research councils.150 Many analysts continue to believe it was 
a principle formulated in 1918 and which continued, long after 1964, and which stated that 
scientists should control government-funded research. Such a principle never existed, 
except in discussions of science policy,  seriously misleading analysts as to the nature of 
government funded research. 
 
The nationalisation of research and development went hand in hand with an incremental 
nationalisation of the universities.  The huge new demand of the state and industry for 
scientists, engineers, and to a lesser extent doctors, led to a radical expansion of higher 
education, especially in London and the major civic universities, which were now funded 
largely by central government.  By the 1960s, universal funding for student maintenance 
as well as fees meant that all universities were, for the first time, overwhelmingly dedicated 
to full-time residential education geared towards the three-year honours degree (or four in 
Scotland).  By this time the majority of male graduates studied science, engineering, or 
medicine.  While at the beginning of the century, churchmen, lawyers, and doctors had 
dominated the professional middle classes, by 1940 they accounted for about half the total, 
their numbers having remained static while those of scientists, and especially engineers, 
had risen rapidly.  
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State funding for research in universities increased massively; for academic scientists the 
1950s and 1960s were a golden age.  Many new fields built directly on war-projects and 
equipment, from digital computing and radio astronomy to nuclear power and antibiotics, 
and a self-confident and creative scientific élite moulded the great universities, not least 
through the experience of administration and command that many young scientists had 
gained in the war.  In terms of public recognition and achievement, perhaps the most 
famous British developments were in X-ray crystallography applied to molecular biology: 
from Maurice Wilkins and Rosalind Franklin in London, to James Watson and Francis 
Crick in Cambridge, and to the elucidation of the structures of other large molecules by 
Max Perutz, John Kendrew, and the biochemist Fred Sanger.151  In physics, the acclaimed 
successes were in theoretical cosmology, and in radio astronomy – from Manchester’s 
Jodrell Bank, to the rather different Cambridge work.152 In ecology and population biology 
a distinctive school became influential in science policy.153 Both these Universities also 
attracted attention for work on electronic computers.  But of course, the public successes 
were a tiny proportion of the total academic research about which we as yet know very 
little, historically.  Yet there is no doubt that British academic research was enormously 
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productive in the years after the Second World War; in the history of almost all disciplines, 
one has to consider the British contributions. 
 
Ideologues and ideologies 
The scientific left of the 1930s were active into the 1940s, before foundering in what E. P. 
Thompson has called a post-war “NATOpolitan” culture, like most of the rest of this 
tradition.154 Scientific intellectuals dissembled to the point of mendacity about the relations 
of science and war.155  In the three post-war decades, the dominant ideological tone of 
science, like that of political culture more generally, was broadly social democratic and 
technocratic, with a particular emphasis on the need for national modernisation programs.  
The relative economic decline of Britain, now being dated from 1870s, was commonly 
blamed on a failure to invest in science and technology. And in C. P. Snow’s “two cultures” 
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polemic and elsewhere,156 the British political class was presented as aristocratic and 
amateur -- hostile to science and engineering, careless of economic growth.157 It was 
claimed that anti-scientific traditions were behind the anti-nuclear and environmental 
movements.158 This kind of thinking reached its highpoint during the Labour government 
of 1964-1970; Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s “White Heat of the scientific revolution” 
is usually taken as the major peacetime technocratic initiative in British history, and one 
that failed.159   
 
It is explicit or implicit in most commentary that Britain’s technocratic tradition, where it 
existed, was on the left.  But a new scientific left – much less élite and much more critical 
of science – emerged in the 1960s, notably around the British Society for Social 
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Responsibility in Science.  Their key concerns were the abuse of biology (for example in 
IQ testing), industrial hazards, environmental degradation, and state use of new repressive 
technologies.160  Both generations of Marxist scientists and scholars contributed 
considerably to the social study of British science, not least its history, from Bernal to 
Robert M. Young and beyond.161 
 
The scientific right is much less studied, though it is clear that anti-technocratic 
conservation movements were established between the wars, partly to protect the 
countryside from pylons and creeping suburbia.162  A liberal critique of planned science 
was developed from the late 30s, and was associated with post-war opposition to “state 
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medicine.”  Its ablest ideologue was the Hungarian émigré Michael Polanyi, Professor of 
Physical Chemistry and then of Social Philosophy at Manchester, and closely associated 
with classically liberal philosophers and economists such as Friedrich von Hayek.  They 
were profoundly hostile not only to Marxism but also to centrist scientism, and their 
writings were well supported by the CIA.163  Yet there were also powerful technocratic 
traditions on the right that helped drive nationalistic scientific and technological policies, 
and certainly the great military-technological effort.164 
 
From the late 1960s then, post-war technocratic nationalism came under attack from both 
wings of politics: from the Left who were antimilitarist, environmentalist, and sceptical of 
pharmaceuticals; and from the neo-liberal economists of the Right who attacked state 
technology, though only the civil version.165  The 1970s saw increased scepticism about 
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large-scale civilian programs, like the Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor and the Concorde, 
and modernisation through science and technology increasingly lost its appeal to younger 
generations of intellectuals, influenced by ecological concerns and a more culturally 
oriented New Left.  As we note below, these attacks did not bring the end of such programs, 
but the old triumphalism was gone.  And it was the neo-liberal right, rather than the 
libertarian left that won out ideologically.  Indeed by the 1980s, Britain, with the United 
States, was at the center of a general ideological, political, and economic shift to the right, 
strengthened by a new economic globalization and victory in the Cold War. 
 
For many politicians around the world, Thatcherism as well as Reaganomics became 
models for new relations among governments, industry, and public services.  Though she 
was the first scientist prime minister (with a chemistry degree from Oxford), Margaret 
Thatcher was deeply sceptical of “social engineering” and of the professions, including 
medicine.  Her denationalisation of industry – a mixture of privatization and liberalization 
– went along with a further denationalization of research.  Her advisors were hostile to the 
planning of science, yet paradoxically the Thatcher years saw a radical centralisation of 
control over the universities, and a strengthening of central control of state-funded 
research.  The aim was to cut expenditure and to change culture,166 and in this she 
succeeded.  The old certainties of public service and state-led development gave way to a 
cult of entrepreneurs, managers, and management-consultants, which continued to operate 
in the early twenty-first century in the public sector as well as the private.  State funding 
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for university research remained vital, and the popularity of the NHS protected it from 
major moves towards private insurance, but cumbersome external assessment mechanisms 
were imposed on universities and “internal markets” introduced to the NHS.  Large-scale 
philanthropy, especially the cancer charities and the Wellcome Trust, emerged as a major 
determinant of medical research.  The academic scientific community remained generally 
centrist in its politics and committed to increasing state funding.  Indeed in the mid-1980s, 
faced with funding cuts, a scientists’ organisation called “Save British Science” renewed 
the claim that Britain had long been hostile to science and technology.167  Thatcherite 
scientists were rare – an exceptional neo-liberal account of science met with howls of 
rage.168  The scientific élite became increasingly concerned with propaganda for science – 
by the end of the century Britain had invested in “science-centres” aimed at children and 
the bookshops were full of popular science books. 
 
De-nationalization and Internationalization 
In a modernising nation, the state was expected to take an increasing role in leading and 
controlling research and the applications of science and technology – a scientific revolution 
and state planning were felt to go hand in hand.  But slowly, and at first secretly, the 
viability of national programs had come to be questioned.  In 1958 Britain stopped 
independent development of nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors for submarines – it 
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depended on the United States, as it also did for long-range missiles.  In the early 1960s, 
congruent with an early attempt to join the European common market, two large civilian 
trans-national projects were started – the Concorde supersonic airliner (with France) and 
the development of a satellite launcher (through a consortium of European nations).  They 
were followed in the mid-1960s and beyond by Anglo-French and European military 
projects.  In “pure” science too, European organisations played important roles – for 
example the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) and the European 
Molecular Biology Organization (EMBO).169  And by the end of the 1960s it was 
understood that expenditures on research and development, even for civil projects, did not 
correlate positively with economic growth.170 
 
Nonetheless, in some new fields, for example electronics and computing, new national 
programs were developed in the 1970s, and in agriculture the strong state subsidy of private 
industry, supported by state and private research, continued to transform productivity.  
Even in defence, R&D rose in absolute terms in the 1970s and the early 1980s; as a new 
Cold War took root, the state’s R&D program was remilitarised.  But with the ending of 
large-scale civil development programs, the fall in defence R&D from the mid-1980s, and 
the liberalization and privatization of government research under Margaret Thatcher, 
expenditure by government on R&D fell from 0.9 percent to 0.5 percent of GDP by the 
end of the 1990s.  The proportion of GDP devoted to R&D peaked at around 2.3 percent 
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in the early 1960s; in the 1980s and 1990s it drifted downward, to 1.8 percent in 1999 -- 
levels not seen since the 1950s. 
 
Since the 1980s, the previously assumed relations between national capacity in R&D, 
national-champion industrial firms, and national economic development shaped by state 
action have weakened considerably, not least through the continued decline of 
manufacturing industry.  In Britain, more than in most of Europe, privatization, 
marketization, liberalization, internationalization, and globalization have substantially 
modified the structures and processes of science, technology, and medicine, though the 
state continues to fund most university work and the vast majority of health care.  In 1984 
the Anglo-Dutch firm Unilever bought the Plant Breeding Institute and the National Seed 
Development Organisation from the government; in 1998, they were sold on to the U.S. 
firm Monsanto.  The former National Research Development Corporation, set up in 1948 
to exploit public sector research was privatised in 1992.  The atomic weapons 
establishment, part of the Ministry of Defence, was transferred to a private contractor in 
1993.  Large-scale development of British nuclear reactors was run down, and American 
designs imported.  Privatization of electricity supply further reduced the civil nuclear 
program, which was itself privatised in the mid-1990s.  The National Physical Laboratory 
– that great symbol of state civil science – was “contractorised” in 1995, and in 2001 all 
the military laboratories, with the exception of the nuclear program and the biological and 
chemical warfare center at Porton Down were transferred to a new entity called QinetiQ 
plc, which was intended for the private sector.  Many of the national industrial projects of 
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the 1960s and 1970s were later left to the international market.171  Generally, the British 
subsidiaries of foreign multi-nationals performed higher proportions of research, and 
increasing proportions of the industrial research expenditure came from abroad.172   
 
By the end of the 1990s the declinist emphasis on the poverty of British science gave way 
among elite scientists to an emphasis on the strength of British academic science in 
comparative terms.  This new argument for support, congruent with the emergent anti-
declinist accounts, had much evidence in its favor.173  The MRC remained a major 
supporter of world-class biomedical research, especially in molecular biology, but other 
agencies became increasingly important.174  The Wellcome Trust cut its links with the 
parent pharmaceutical company and became a major funder of medical research, alongside 
the cancer charities.  Around 2000, it collaborated with government in a widespread 
renovation of university science facilities.  The drug industry saw a series of mergers, and 
some internationalisation of research, but remained competitive.  For medical technology, 
where Britain was notable for inventions in the 50s and 60s (for example, the CT scanner 
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developed by EMI and the artificial hip developed by a surgeon, John Charnley), British 
companies tended to be overtaken by American rivals, which were faster to innovate and 
familiar with their larger and richer markets.175 
 
In Britain around 2000, the biomedical sciences seemed increasingly central to economic 
policy as well as health.  Whether they achieved any significant economic impact is another 
matter.176  In universities, they easily rivalled the physical sciences, which had long 
dominated the science faculties.  But they were also controversial; Britain was known 
worldwide for the epidemic of mad cow disease in the last years of the Conservative 
government, and New Labour was rocked in 2001 by a major outbreak of Foot and Mouth 
Disease.  Both helped build a public suspicion, which is also evident in British debates over 
vaccination, genetically modified organisms, and the retention of bodily organs in 
hospitals.177  Large increases in funds for medicine, not least through charities, have 
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accompanied continued public scepticism and a loss of authority by medical professionals.  
Doctors and the new ranks of managers and health economists have pushed for “evidence-
based medicine,” but in an increasingly litigious and consumerist context.  In medicine, the 
concerns are usually raised by the patients’ groups that have proliferated since the 1970s; 
for environmental issues the chief propagandists are international charities such as 
Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth.   
 
In the early twenty-first century, public discussions about science in Britain have been less 
about national economic growth or defence, and more about the possibilities and threats of 
informatics and molecular medicine.  The politics of science have become increasingly 
public and international; but no longer, if ever, could one easily line up science versus anti-
science, though this is how the science lobby sometimes portrays its problems.  
Increasingly, we would argue, science must be understood as multiplex, and projects 
examined for the different values they incorporate.  The critique of science can then be 
much more than a demand for more (or less); it could be about choices between projects 
and between different kinds of science-politics, about the development of science, about 
on-going history. 
 
As we have tried to show, the older historiographies of British science often relied 
uncritically on arguments made by researchers to demand more funds.  Those arguments 
were often about industry and military might.  But much of the industry and the might have 
now departed, and newer debates are concerned more with effects of science than with 
levels of investment.  In the early twenty-first century, most of Britain’s opinion-formers 
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have barely known the Empire, or ever felt Britain to be a Great Power.  They grew up in 
a world when economic status was insecure, and they learned to see a world where 
economic success has been spread among many nations, east and west.  As globalization 
and economic communities have weakened the nation-state, as the priorities of medicine 
have been debated and those of economic development have come under environmentalist 
scrutiny, we will need more varied and more international histories.  In these international 
histories, Britain will have a major place; for over the span of this chapter – from the global 
Empire to its end, and across a wide range of political and institutional regimes – Britain 
has remained among the most creative of scientific nations. 
